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1. Background 
 
1. Background 
 
Presently, legal regulation of participation of employees – financial participation as well 
as participation in decision-making – is not well developed in Estonia. On the one 
hand, it is due to the fact that no tradition of employee participation could have been 
formed after Estonia became independent because different, contrary political aims, 
e.g. development of the free-market economy and promotion of national elites, were 
given priority. Although employee ownership emerged during the early stage of 
privatization, it was a temporary phenomenon. Earlier experience with employee 
participation in decision-making was considered to be a relict from the time under 
Soviet rule and, therefore, to be discredited and not worth following. On the other 
hand, the solution of current employment and social problems is not associated with a 
higher level of participation of employees. 
 
a) History 
Historically, participation of employees was related to co-operative movement and, 
later, to privatization procedures, especially at the early stage in the end of the 80ies. 
Co-operative movement started at the beginning of the last century with agricultural 
co-operatives and reached its peak during the first independence period (1,156 co-
operatives in 1927) with co-operatives in different branches such as fishing, insurance, 
crafts, agriculture and consumer co-operatives.2 However, these co-operatives were not 
owned by employees. Under socialist rule, Estonia had a large consumer co-operative 
sector. After the beginning of privatization, consumer and supply co-operatives mostly 
remained in the hands of their members, although some related firms became 
subsidiary companies to central co-operatives.  
The early start of the economic and political transition in Estonia was closely 
connected to the fight for independence. In the aftermath of the August coup, the 
national question played an important role. The majority of industrial workers were 
Russian-speaking. In the early years most of them did not get Estonian citizenship. 
They had no voting rights for parliament. Therefore, they had very limited political 
power. In this way the group of workers was split and their political influence was quite 
small. At the same time the political debate in the first years of transition was not 
focused on economic problems, but rather on the national question. This is a main 
explanation why the support for employee ownership which was inherited from the 
Soviet legislation was abolished during the early years of transition (Mygind, 1994).  
In the first stages of transition the workers could use some of their power connected 
to the Workers' Councils. Especially, in Estonia, these councils did have some 
influence, but they were split in a pro-Russian and a pro-Estonian organization quite 
early in the process (Terk, 1996). During the transition especially the Russian-speaking 
                                                 
2  See Krinal, V. (2001): 100 aastat eestlaste ühistegevust, Ühistegelised uudised, Okt., Nov. 
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part of the employees lost influence. This is probably an appropriate explanation 
behind the decreasing importance of employee-ownership at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
The development of participation concept in connection with privatization started 
under the Soviet rule when such new forms as small state enterprises (Order of the 
Soviet Government on Small State Enterprises 43/1986 and 91/1987), private co-
operatives (Soviet Law on Co-operatives from 26 May 1988) and enterprises leased by 
the workers’ collectives (Decree of the Supreme Soviet on Leasing and Leasing 
Relations from April 1989 and Decree of the President of the Soviet Union on the 
Basic Principles of Leasing from November 1989) were introduced according to Soviet 
legislation. Whereas co-operatives became a popular form in Estonia from the 
beginning and did not disappear after Estonia became independent (Mygind, 1995, p. 
239),3 only few leased enterprises (12) were founded under Soviet law (Terk, 1996, p. 
112). Enterprises could be leased on the initiative of 2/3 of the employees; the 
enterprise remained in state ownership, but it was managed by the management board 
elected at the general meeting of employees and ownership could be transferred after 
depreciation of assets or through buy-out. Small state enterprises, as their name shows, 
also remained in state ownership, but could control profits, prices and salaries and 
were granted tax allowances. At the early stage of privatization, additional forms of 
semi-private enterprises, people’s enterprises (Estonian Charter of People’s Enterprises 
from 11 December 1989) and leased enterprises (Estonian Law on Leasing from 26 
September 1990 and Estonian Government Order on Leasing Relations from January 
1991), were introduced also according to Estonian law.4 People’s enterprises could be 
established on the initiative of at least ¾ of the workers’ collective. The enterprise 
remained in state ownership, but authority of the owner concerning management and 
partly concerning revenue was transferred to the enterprise on the basis of a trust 
concept. This form, although introduced under Estonian legislation, was considered to 
be a relict of the socialist economy and, therefore, not wide-spread (only 7 enterprises) 
(Mygind, 1995, p. 240). More popular was the leasing model according to Estonian law. 
Although the Estonian legal acts as compared to the Soviet law did not limit the group 
of persons authorized to apply for leasing to the workers’ collective, it granted the 
workers’ collective preferential treatment, since employees were not obliged to invest 
20 per cent of the book value of the enterprise to be allowed to lease the enterprise. All 
these semi-private forms provided employees with decision-making rights 
(management election), but financial participation of employees was limited. 
Nevertheless, as proto-forms they constituted a convenient platform for takeover by 
employees and/or management during privatization. E.g., it is assumed that leased 
enterprises were major source of employee ownership in Estonia (Jones et al., 2003, p. 
10). These forms might still exist and have to be considered since the Commercial Law 
                                                 
3  Further details on co-operatives see II. 1. b) bb). 
4  Since Estonia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 16 November 1988 and the 
Soviet Union / Russian Federation recognized it only in 1991, there was a period of conflicting 
jurisdictions. 
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addresses leased enterprises, collective enterprises and state small enterprises in § 509 
(6) as being transformable to limited liability companies and joint-stock companies. 
The first stage of actual privatization was privatization of small and middle-sized 
enterprises according to the Law on Privatization of State-Owned Service, Trade and 
Catering Enterprises from 29 December 1990 which granted employees pre-emptive 
right to buy the enterprise at the initial price. It must be noted that also 7 large 
enterprises were privatized under the above law in June 1991 and were taken over by 
employees. According to amendment of May 1992, the scope of the law was extended 
to all small and middle-sized enterprises, but rights of employees were reduced to 
purchasing the enterprise at the highest price (limited by law) at an auction. After 
adoption of the Privatization Law in 1993 regulating all privatization procedures 
including small privatization, all privileges of employees in the course of small 
privatization were abolished, but, at this stage, small privatization was almost 
completed and 80% of enterprises as estimated were taken over by insiders (Mygind, 
1995, p. 240).  
Large privatization started relatively late because there was no consensus of main 
political forces on basic principles of privatization, but already early conceptions 
contained plans to reduce the rights of employees. The Government concept from 
September 1990 indicated that the number of shares to be sold to employees should be 
reduced to 20% and discounts for employees should be limited. In the draft of 
Privatization Law submitted by the Popular Front in May 1991 discounts for 
employees were abolished, but pre-emptive rights remained. This draft law was 
rejected by a narrow margin. The PL finally adopted in 1993 followed the German 
Treuhand model and contained no preferential rights of employees.  Reasons given for 
this concept were, on the one hand, political tensions with Russian-speaking employees 
and, on the other hand, analyses of privatization practice in other transition countries, 
e.g. in Poland (Terk, 1996, p. 108). 
Privatization vouchers, which were introduced in 1993 to all permanent residents of 
Estonia according to the length of employment, could be used as substitute for cash in 
auctions and tenders of enterprises. They could also be used for public offerings of 
shares in the 39 large companies where the majority of shares were sold to a core 
investor (Mygind, 2000, p. 60). However, they were mostly used for privatization of 
land and housing; only 39% were used by the population to purchase shares of 
enterprises (Terk, 2000, p. 172). Privatization vouchers could have been used for 
payment in privatization until 1 December 2000 (§ 29 (2) PL).   
Unlike privatization in the industrial sector, employees were granted more rights in 
privatization in agriculture. Collective farms were privatized according to the Law on 
Agricultural Reform from March 1992, whereby former owners entitled to restitution 
(§ 14 LOR) and employees according to their working shares (based on length of 
employment in agriculture and job description) became co-owners and were entitled to 
vote at the general meeting. Owners and users of ‘structures in agriculture’ and 
domestic physical persons and legal entities engaged in agricultural production were 
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granted pre-emptive rights in privatization of land (§ 22 LRL). If application for 
privatization on the basis of pre-emptive right was submitted before 1 January 2002, 
the selling price corresponded to the assessed value in 1993 or 1996 if then the value 
was lower than in 1993 (§ 22/3 (1) LRL) and it could be fully paid in vouchers (§ 22/3 
(4) LRL). According to these regulations and by founding co-operatives, many 
employees in agriculture became co-owners and thus obtained participation rights. 
 
b) Social Partners 
Currently, the social partners are represented by the Confederation of Estonian Trade 
Unions (Eesti Ametiühingute Keskliit) and the Estonian Employers’ Confederation 
(Eesti Tööandjate Keskliit). The power relation between social partners in Estonia is 
asymmetric, the trade unions being traditionally the weaker party.  
First trade unions were formed in Tallinn 1905, first central organization of trade 
unions in 1927. However, a government-friendly workers’ union which did not 
effectively protect the interests of employees was formed instead of trade unions in 
1936. Under Soviet rule, union membership was obligatory and the trade unions 
functioned as an instrument of the Communist party to control workers and managers. 
Therefore, the traditional unions had lost their credibility, and their role and 
membership diminished after the independence in 1991. The central trade union had 
700000 members in 1991, only half of this number in 1993 and only 50000 in 2001. 
Union membership as percentage of all employees fell from 87% in 1991 to 15% in 
2001 (Eamets et al., 2003). 
Recent debates on participation of employees between the social partners arose due to 
the necessity to transform the acquis communautaire into Estonian law. At the beginning 
of 2004, the social partners were involved in preparation of the draft law on social 
dialogue by which the EC Directive 94/45/EC on European Workers’ Councils; the 
EC Directive 2002/14/EC on national consultation rules and the EC Directive 
2001/86/EC supplementing the statute for a European company with regard to 
employee involvement required in the case of establishing a European company were 
to be transformed into Estonian law. The Confederation of Estonian Trade Unions 
demanded that the law should establish conditions for effective social dialogue by 
regulating the information and consultation procedures and delimitation of powers of 
state authorities, extend control power of employees by stipulating representation of 
employees on the board of public enterprises and private enterprises with more than 
300 employees and ensure implementation by introducing stricter rules for state 
control. The Estonian Employers’ Confederation argued that the draft law contained 
more obligations for employers than the respective EC directives and that strict rules 
will hinder rather than help to develop the social dialogue. Further, the Confederation 
opposed the idea of employees’ representatives becoming members of management 
bodies. Since the government was not willing to play the role of the arbitrator and the 
social partners could not find a compromise solution, bipartite consultations ended in 
March 2004 with the recommendation to withdraw the draft law and to prepare a new 
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draft law on collective labour relations incorporating Law on Collective Agreements, 
Law on Settlement of Collective Labour Disputes and Law on Employees 
Representatives. 
Another controversial debate between the social partners took place in connection 
with the draft law on Involvement of Employees in the Activities of EC-scale 
Undertakings, EC-scale Groups of Undertakings and European Companies, and also 
in this case no result was achieved.5 However, the Parliament adopted this law on 12 
January 2005.  
Generally, the idea of participation of employees could not be successfully promoted 
until now. The legal secretary at the Confederation of Estonian Trade Union Ms Tiia 
Tammeleht declared in an interview that the question of financial participation of 
employees is currently not on the agenda of the Confederation.6 The Estonian 
Employers’ Confederation is strongly opposed to any extension of employee 
participation rights. 
However, it must be noted that recent discussions concerned only employee 
participation in decision-making, which is generally contrary to the interests of 
employers, and not financial participation of employees, which could, under certain 
circumstances, have advantages for both employees and employers.  
 
c) Current National Policy 
Current unemployment, especially of young and elder persons, and high costs 
connected with employment makes the government consider other employment and 
social problems, e.g. participation rights of employees, as being secondary. Mr Tiit 
Kaadu from the Ministry of Social Affairs affirmed in an interview that the ministry 
acknowledged lack of legislation concerning employee participation, but has other 
priorities so far. According to Mr Kaadu, the initiative to improve the situation would 
have to come from the trade unions (Eamets et al., 2003), whereas, as stated above, the 
trade unions are not planning to address this issue either.  
Participation of employees has not been on the political agenda of the Parliament. The 
only political party which addressed this issue is the Social Democratic party. Social 
democrats have been in opposition for the last five years and currently hold only 6 of 
101 seats. They proposed amendments to the Commercial Code regarding 
representation of employees in management bodies of corporations several times, but 
these initiatives were rejected by other political forces. 
Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that new legal regulations on employee 
participation in Estonia will be adopted on the initiative of Estonian social partners or 
other political forces in the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
5  For further details see II.1.b) aa) (3). 
6  Interviews with Mr Kaadu and Ms Tammeleht were conducted by Ms Johanna Korhonen in 
January 2005. 
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2. Types of Schemes and their Legal Foundations 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of special legal regulation of financial participation of 
employees, the economic research shows that individual Estonian enterprises use 
different financial participation schemes (employee shares, stock options and profit-
sharing) on the basis of articles of association or internal rules. Obviously, overall legal 
regulation does not - at least purposefully - create incentives, but also does not inhibit 
the development of some forms of financial participation, excluding such complicated 
forms as ESOP for which state legal regulation and tax incentives are needed. 
Therefore, this paper will focus on general provisions of privatization, company, tax 
and labour law and on their potential role for development of financial participation.  
 
a) Employee Share Ownership and its Legal Foundations 
The most common form of employee participation in Estonia is employee share 
ownership which had been obtained mostly during privatization and to which the 
provisions of company, securities and tax law currently in force are applicable. 
 
(1) Privatization Issues 
Although privatization in Estonia can be considered virtually completed, since the 
overwhelming majority of enterprises have been privatized and the Estonian 
Privatization Agency was closed on 1 November 2001 (§ 11 (1) PL) after completing 
the last big privatization deal selling AS Eesti Raudtee (Estonian Railways), enterprises 
of the energy sector and public utilities are still partly owned by the state and could be 
sold in the future. For that reason, the laws regulating privatization (Privatization Law 
from 17 June 1993 (hereinafter referred to as PL); Law on Ownership Reform from 13 
June 1991 (hereinafter referred to as LOR); Law on Land Reform from 17 October 
1991 (hereinafter referred to as LLR)) are still effective, but substantially amended. 
Employee ownership in Estonia could emerge only at a very early stage of privatization 
because all privileges of employees in connection with privatization were abolished 
after the consolidated concept of privatization was laid down in the Privatization Law 
adopted on 17 June 1993. Since the Estonian legislation did not differentiate between 
employees and management when regulating preferential rights of the staff of 
enterprises in the privatization process, the term ‘employees’ shall be used as a generic 
term for employees and management for the purposes of presentation of legal 
regulation. 
The basic concept of privatization in Estonia which is fundamental for PL and LOR 
and still effective is direct sale to the highest bidder at a public tender supplemented by 
restitution (see § 36 (1) LOR).  
Thus, the effective PL (as amended on 14 November 2001) contains no privileges for 
employees nor for other groups of potential buyers which is understandable as the 
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effective law is based on the provision on termination of activities of the Privatization 
Agency (§ 1 (1) PL) and thus on termination of main privatization proceedings, 
although further smaller privatization proceedings are anticipated and therefore a new 
‘government agency organising privatization’ (§ 4 (1) PL) is established. The only pre-
emptive right contained in the PL concerns private shareholders who hold shares in 
partly state-owned enterprises: they have pre-emptive right to purchase shares from the 
state at a price determined by the organiser of privatization, ie the respective state or 
municipal agency (§ 2 (4) PL). This might apply to employees if they are minority 
shareholders in their own enterprise still partly owned by the state. 
Since the privatization process is almost completed, the few privileges of employees in 
Estonian legislation have been abolished. Initially, pre-emptive rights, which often also 
lead to the possibility to buy assets or shares under value, were the most popular 
mechanism. In privatization in the industrial sector, most influential political forces 
were opposed to buy-outs by employees, so that all preferential rights of employees 
were abolished as early as 1993. Other political preferences determined privatization in 
the agricultural sector, so that preferential treatment, both in privatization of 
enterprises and of land, was granted to employees of agricultural enterprises, but these 
rights were also terminated due to the completion of main privatization procedures. 
Pursuant to the effective PL, employees are not entitled to participate in the decision-
making process during privatization procedure. However, rights to participate in 
decision-making in the new company, e.g. voting right at the general meeting, right to 
call the general meeting etc., are attached to the shares if they were acquired by 
employees in the course of privatization.   
 
(2) Company and Securities Law 
Although employee ownership on shares of their enterprises purchased during 
privatization is decreasing, some employees still hold shares and thus have the rights 
attached to these securities according to company and securities law. In Estonia, 
company law is primarily laid down in the Commercial Code from 15 February 19957 
(hereinafter referred to as CC) and securities law in the Securities Market Law from 17 
October 2001 (hereinafter referred to as SML). Estonian company law is strongly 
influenced by German law, so that even rulings of German courts can be used for 
interpretation of provisions of the Estonian CC (Klauberg, 2004, p. 1). However, 
special rules on participation of employees in management and decision-making which 
are contained in a special German law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) were not considered 
by the Estonian law-maker.  
According to CC, there are the following five kinds of undertakings: sole proprietor (§§ 
3, 75 ff. CC), general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company 
(osaühing, §§ 135 ff. CC) and joint-stock company (aktiaselts, §§ 221 ff. CC). For 
                                                 
7  An important part of commercial law also constitutes the Law on Commercial Associations from 
19 December 2001, which will be addressed under II.1.b) bb). 
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neither of these forms, there are special rules on employee share ownership concerning 
acquisition, limitation of the number of shares or issuing employee stock, so that 
general rules apply. The quantitative distribution of different business forms shows 
which forms are more popular, and this might have an impact on development of 
specific employee participation forms now and in the future.  
Table 1. Business forms, non-profit associations and foundations  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sole proprietor 19,443 20,563 21,464 21,830 
General partnership 305 318 342 365 
Limited partnership 468 601 630 660 
Limited liability company 43,266 49,060 54,387 59,767 
Joint-stock company 7,862 7,412 6,743 6,241 
Commercial association 933 910 855 775 
Branch of foreign company 331 356 365 388 
Non-profit association 15,886 17,774 19,369 21,293 
Foundation 436 502 570 638 
Total 88,930 97,496 104,725 111,957 
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia 
 
(a) Corporations 
As the above table shows, most legal entities are corporations, whereby limited liability 
companies are the most popular business form. Since the most wide-spread form of 
financial participation of employees in Estonia is share ownership, legal regulation of 
the rights of shareholders directly influences financial participation. All shareholders 
have voting rights at the general meeting (for LLC § 174, for JSC § 226), with the 
exception of holders of preferred shares in a JSC who have no or restricted voting 
rights (§ 237 CC), right to initiate calling the general meeting (for LLC § 171 (2) 3 CC, 
for JSC § 296 CC), right to elect and remove members of the management board or of 
the supervisory council (for LLC § 184 (1), (3), for JSC § 298 (1) 4 CC), to receive 
dividends (for LLC § 148 (5), for JSC § 226), to transfer shares (for LLC § 149 (1), if 
articles of association do not provide otherwise; for JSC § 229 (1) CC) and to receive 
assets in the case of liquidation (for LLC § 148 (2), for JSC § 226 CC). All shareholders 
have a pre-emptive right to purchase shares which other shareholders of their company 
are going to sell (for LLC § 149 (2), (3), for JSC § 229 (2) CC). In the case of capital 
increase, a share increasing the size of the share can be set off against a claim of the 
shareholder to the company upon the resolution of the general meeting provided that 
this does not harm the interests of the company and its creditors (for LLC § 194 (1), 
for JSC § 346 CC). 
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Since employees who became shareholders acquired often minority shares in newly 
founded LLC and JSC during privatization, especially provisions concerning shares 
acquired before 1 September 1995 and rights of minority shareholders are of special 
importance. Pursuant to § 515 (1) and (2) CC, rights attached to shares issued before 1 
September 1995 which do not comply with the provisions of the Commercial Code 
remain valid, whereas rights not attached to shares are void. Minority shareholders of a 
JSC can be bought out by the majority shareholder holding at least 9/10 of the shares 
upon resolution of the general meeting with at least 95% of the votes represented by 
all shares; a fair compensation to minority shareholders in this case is secured by the 
provisions regarding takeover bids (§§ 363 2 (2), 363 7 (1) CC) and the right to lodge a 
claim with a court (§ 363 8 (2), (3) CC). Minority shareholders have no corresponding 
sell-out right. 
In the SML, employees and management are mentioned in connection with the 
prospectus if securities are offered to employees and requirements concerning an 
investment firm. If securities issued by a company are offered solely to employees or 
managers of this company the prospectus need not be made public and registered (§ 17 
(1) 2) SML), which means that employees and management are not entitled to 
compensation pursuant to § 25 SML if they suffer losses as a result of volatility of 
acquired securities. It seems to be justified since management and employees might 
have insider knowledge, but it could be argued that employees, unlike managers, not 
necessarily have full information on the financial situation of the company. Notably, 
employees are not deemed insiders, but third persons, who could receive information 
from insiders, under the same law (§ 191 (1), (3) SML). If a company provides 
investment services only to its employees and management, it has not to be registered 
as an investment firm (§ 42 1) SML). The consequence is that this company can 
conduct investment activities without licence (§ 48 ff. SML), is not obliged to notify 
about transactions (§ 91 SML) and to have additional reserve and risk funds (§§ 93 ff. 
SML) and there are no additional requirements for managers (§ 79 SML).  
As there are no special rules concerning employees, there are apparently no incentives 
for companies, apart from facilitation of share sales and providing investment services 
within the company of employees, but the consequence of these rules is lack of control 
and limitation of liability for the company. If employees are also shareholders, they 
have voting rights in each company form, although they generally have weak influence 
on resolutions of the general meeting being minority shareholders in most cases. 
Minority shareholders who represent at least 10 % of the share capital are entitled to 
demand to call a general meeting (for LLC § 171 (2) 3 CC, for JSC § 296 CC) and to 
lodge a claim with a court for removal of the members of the management board or 
supervisory board with good reason (for LLC § 184 (5) CC, for JSC § 319 (5) CC). 
Additional rights were granted to employees of EC-scale Undertakings, EC-scale 
Groups of Undertakings and European Companies according to the Law on 
Involvement of Employees in the Activities of EC-scale Undertakings, EC-scale 
Groups of Undertakings and European Companies which was adopted on 12 January 
2005 after a long controversial debate between the social partners. The law 
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transformed EC directives 94/45/EC and 2001/86/EC on employee involvement 
required in the case of establishing of a European company requiring nomination of 
employees’ representatives into the Special Commission for Negotiations, the 
European Work Council, the SE Special Commission for Negotiations as well as the 
SE Council or Administrative Council. According to Mr Tiit Kaadu from the Ministry 
of Social Affairs, there are 20 to 25 enterprises in Estonia presently to which this law 
shall be applied. The crucial question in the Estonian debate was participation of trade 
unions in working councils of European companies. The Employers’ Confederation 
argued that representatives of trade unions should not have preferential treatment as 
compared to employee representatives elected at the general meeting of employees. 
Trade unions claimed that the general meeting of employees, but not the trade union is 
usually influenced by the employer. It appears not adequate that the debate was so 
heated considering the fact that the number of European companies in Estonia is quite 
small. However, this debate must be understood as a start of a broader debate on lack 
of participation rights of employees in Estonia which becomes evident if compared 
with neighbouring European states.8 Although the law has been adopted, 
implementation might present difficulties, since, as the Deputy Secretary on Labour 
Policy from the Ministry of Social Affairs Mr Piret Lilleväli stated, these issues are new 
for Estonia and social partners are not strong enough to support the implementation.  
 
(b) Co-operatives 
Co-operatives have been a popular company form in Estonia beginning with the first 
period of independence, during the socialist rule and first experiments under 
Gorbachev and also after Estonia gained independence, but only a small percentage are 
commercial associations. The Estonian law on co-operatives was adopted in 1992 and 
did not differ significantly form the preceding Soviet law from 1988. It was applicable 
to both commercial and non-profit co-operatives. Compared to other parts of the 
Soviet Union, co-operatives developed quite early and rapidly. By January 1990, there 
were more than 2000 co-operatives with about 7% of employment (Arkadie et al., 
1991, p. 258). The number of co-operatives peaked in 1993. According to the 
Statistical Office of Estonia, there were 2,943 co-operatives in August 1993.  Since 
then many co-operatives have been transformed to other legal forms. In July 1998 
there were 2,124 co-operatives in the enterprise register, but only 769 of them were 
registered as profit earning co-operatives (Publication of the Statistical Office of 
Estonia 1998). The development of commercial and non-profit co-operatives showed 
that these two forms are substantially different and it would be appropriate to adopt 
new special laws on each form. For that reason, the structure of statistics was changed 
in 2001, so that the figures before and after 2001 are not comparable. In 2003, there 
were 19,369 non-profit associations (including former housing co-operatives) and 855 
commercial associations.    
                                                 
8  For further details on participation of employees in decision-making in Estonia in a European 
context see Tavits (2004). 
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In the context of employee participation, commercial association regulated by the Law 
on Commercial Associations from 19 December 2001 (hereinafter referred to as LCA) 
is relevant. According to the new law, commercial association is a flexible form for 
associations of physical persons or legal entities not owned by the state, whereby each 
member has one vote (§ 1 LCA). Generally, members are not personally liable, but 
personal or additional liability can be stipulated in the articles of association during 
foundation or by amendment of the articles of association for which over ¾ votes of 
members is necessary (§§ 1 (2), 13 (1) LCA). The profit is generally transferred to the 
reserve, but it can also be distributed among members according to the participation of 
members in the activities of association or in proportion to contribution if it is 
stipulated in the articles of association and if at least 1/20 of the net profit is 
transferred to the reserve (§§ 29, 30 LCA). Majorities in voting and management 
structure are similar to the LLC. 
The new law seems to be an administrative challenge for small agricultural co-
operatives, so that the state considers it necessary to provide financial support to 
agricultural commercial associations for foundation and administrative expenses. The 
legal foundation for such subsidies constitute §§ 59-61 of the Law on Rural 
Development and Agricultural Market Regulation from 11 October 2000. The 
subsidies are granted if at least five of members of the commercial association are 
agricultural producers and if one of the areas of activity of the association is connected 
to agriculture (§ 60) at a certain rate for maximally five years (§ 61). 
Theoretically, co-operative is an appropriate business form for employee-owned 
enterprises. New legislation on commercial associations seems to bring advantages, 
since – which is not typical for co-operative as a business form – liability can be limited 
and profit can be distributed. However, if the liability is limited, the association capital 
must be at least 40,000 EEK (§ 1 (3) LCA) as the minimal share capital of a LLC (§ 
136 LLC). Co-operatives were owned by employees in Estonia only at the early stage 
of transition in the end of the 1980s-at the beginning of the 1990s. The number of 
commercial associations is quite small and decreasing over time. The reason seems to 
be higher administrative expenses and higher requirements concerning management. 
Under LCA, each member has one vote at the general meeting, but the regulation on 
delimitation of power between the general meeting and the management board is not 
detailed. Thus, LLC could be preferred to a commercial association because the legal 
regulation is explicit and unambiguous. 
 
(c) Partnerships 
Partnerships are a traditional business form for small enterprises owned by employees 
from human capital intensive firms as IT and law firms to small family enterprises e.g. 
in trade and catering. Interestingly, human capital intensive firms in Estonia do not 
choose this business form, preferring LLC. For that reason, the number of 
partnerships in Estonia, especially general partnerships, is very small. Partnerships in 
Estonia are divided in general partnerships (täisühing) and limited partnerships 
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(usaldusühing) under CC. The most important disadvantage of partnerships is personal 
liability of partners (for general partnership § 125 CC, for limited partnership 
concerning general partner § 125 CC, concerning limited partners § 132 CC). In a 
limited partnership, liability is limited for limited partners, but they are not entitled to 
represent the company and to participate in management unless the articles of 
association provide otherwise (§ 128 (1), 131 (1) CC).  
In partnerships, partners are usually co-owners and managers at the same time. 
However, joint personal liability of partners makes both sole proprietorship and LLC 
more attractive alternatives. A specific form of partnership where it is possible that 
only one partner is liable if the damage is caused by him personally as in German law 
firms does not exist in Estonia. Although at least general partners dominate the 
decision making proceedings in partnerships, it is difficult to find a solution if partners 
disagree. The liability and succession are additional risk factors.   
 
b) Profit-Sharing 
Special legislation concerning profit-sharing with regard to employees does not exist, 
so that there are neither direct incentives nor direct restrictions. Although it is 
preferable for employees to receive dividends instead of wages/salary since they do not 
have to pay income tax on dividends, the company has to pay income tax on 
dividends. Due to this interest conflict and to the fact that shareholders among 
employees are not numerous such scheme of profit-sharing is not wide-spread. More 
popular are monetary incentive schemes where the bonus is not dependent on profit 
(Mygind, 2002, p. 19). For taxation reasons, it is more profitable for employees to be 
employed as self-employed persons rather than as wage-earners (better possibilities for 
tax deductions). For employees in higher positions and with management experience, 
the combination of self-employment with LLC is most profitable. The substantial 
advantage of LLC is the fact that that no corporate income tax is imposed in Estonia, 
the disadvantage is additional administrative work and possibly administrative costs 
which can be minimized if the employee has corresponding experience. 
 
c) Taxation Issues 
General provisions on taxation are contained in the Taxation Law and imposing of 
special taxes is regulated by the Income Tax Law from 15 December 1999 (hereinafter 
referred to as ITL), Value Added Tax Law and Social Tax Law. In connection with 
financial participation of employees, the ITL is relevant. If income tax on wages is 
higher than income tax on dividends, it would be an advantage for introduction of 
schemes of financial participation of employees. 
There is no corporate income tax. Personal income tax on wages is paid as a 
withholding tax with a rate of 24% in 2005 (§ 4 (1) ITL) (the rate will decrease to 22% 
in 2006 and 20% in 2007). In addition, the employee shall pay a social tax of 33% and a
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pension fund payment of 2% which is withheld by the company from the gross salary. 
The third payment besides income tax affecting the salary is an unemployment 
insurance payment of which 1% is withheld from the gross salary and 0,5% from the 
gross salary is paid by the company. However, the employee is not obliged to pay 
income tax on received dividends, unless dividends are paid by a foreign legal entity or 
by an association or from a pool of assets which does not have the status of a legal 
entity (§ 18 (1), (4) ITL). 
Instead, the resident company pays income tax on distributed profits despite the fact 
whether the distribution is monetary or non-monetary (§ 50 ITL). Only if profits are 
distributed as a so called bonus issue no income tax is paid. The company shall pay 
income tax of the net sum of the distributed sum according to the formula set in § 4 
(1) ITL. This means 18.24%, i.e. 24/76 x distributed amount.  
Thus it can be concluded that financial participation as dividends on shares or other 
forms of profit-sharing is preferable to the wage-earner position for the employee, but 
less advantageous for the company.  
 
 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
In this section, it will be shown how employee ownership and profit-sharing emerged 
and what development lead to the current situation regarding employee participation. 
 
a) Small Privatization 
While the initial legislation on small privatization introduced in spring 1991 favoured 
insiders, after May 1992 most of these preferences were taken away. In the early 
version of PL employees had the right to buy the enterprise at the initial price, in most 
cases much below the market value of the assets. It is estimated that around 80% of 
the first wave of 450 small enterprises were taken over by insiders before the change in 
policy (Kein et al., 1995, p. 146).  Subsequently, the importance of insider ownership in 
privatization process declined. Insiders were merely entitled to match the final bid 
whereas the amount was limited by law. According to the amendment of May 1992 the 
circle of participants in privatization was widened to include foreigners. In the PL from 
June 1993, the last privileges of insiders were taken away. The control of the 
privatization process including small privatization was transferred to the Estonian 
Privatization Agency. The development in sales can be found in Table 2. At this stage 
of small privatization, the method of sale by auction included relatively small objects, 
often spin-offs from larger companies. However, the price per object increased 
considerably during the period, and since June 1993 no formal limit of the asset value 
for sale on auctions has existed.  
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Table 2. Small privatization in Estonia (objects sold by auction) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total 
Objects 211* 556* 252 126 120 84 64 20 1,433
Price  million EEK  1.7* 42* 128 68 80 149 161 287 917 
Av. price 1,000 EEK 8* 76* 508 540 666 1,774 2,516 14,350 678 
Av.price 1,000 1995 EEK 312 276 970 697 666 1,442 1,838 3,689 659 
*1991 and 1992 data from Purju (1996), other years from EPA. 1991 price was 18 million Rubles. 
Estonian Privatization Agency estimates the total number of object 1991-1998 to 1,367 for a total price 
of 893 million EEK. 
It is shown in Table 2 that small privatization proceeded very rapidly in the first years, 
when the assets were sold at very low prices. Note, however, that the increase in 
average price especially in the early years was also due to inflation. Compare data in 
Table 2 with the average price 1995 EEK deflated by CPI. In the later years, the 
increase is caused by the fact that another type of objects, spin-offs of fixed assets 
from enterprises in large privatization, was sold. The small privatization was very fast 
in the early years. In 1991 more than 90% of the enterprises in the service and trade 
sector belonged to the state or municipalities. In 1994 83% of the activities in the 
service sector, 90% of whole sale and 94% of retail sale were private (Purju, 1996). 
At the individual level employee ownership seems to be most stable in small 
enterprises, and more small enterprises have a fairly equal distribution between the 
employee owners compared to the situation in larger enterprises. Based on the sample 
the estimate for the whole economy shows that 29% of the employees were owners in 
1995 falling to around 25% in January 1997 (Jones et al., 1998). 
 
b) Large Privatization 
From 1993, the strategy for large privatization was changed according to the German 
Treuhandanstalt model. The Estonian Privatization Agency put out large enterprises to 
open tender often announced internationally. The offered price was only one of the 
criteria for choosing the buyer. The proposed business plan and guarantees for 
investments and employment also played an important role. In this model the main 
idea was to find a core investor. Since substantial capital was needed, foreign capital 
had an advantage in this process. Also at this stage, since the managerial group often 
had accumulated some capital, it was possible for them to begin to secure loans in the 
rapidly developing system of private banks. Furthermore, domestic capital suppliers 
were allowed to buy on instalment and it was also possible for domestic buyers to use 
vouchers as part of the payment from summer 1994. Hence, at this stage, alliances 
between managers and a broad group of employees were no longer necessary. In 
addition, foreign capital gained increasing access during this stage of large privatization. 
From spring 1996 they were also allowed to buy on instalment and to use vouchers as 
payment. The consequence was that broad groups of employees only seldom had the 
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opportunity to take over their enterprises in this type of privatization (Mygind, 2000, p. 
30). 
The Treuhandanstalt model gained speed during 1993, and the largest number of 
privatization contracts for large enterprises was made in 1994, see Table 3. By the end 
of 1995 most large enterprises had been privatized and by 1999 only a few though 
quite large enterprises remained. At the end of 1998, 483 large enterprises had been 
sold through EPA by direct sale at a total price of around 4.7 billion EEK or 400 
million USD. The investment guarantees amounted to 4.6 billion EEK and the owners 
took over liabilities of 2.2 billion EEK. The table shows a tendency for fewer, but 
larger and more expensive enterprise privatizations, 1994-1997. 
Table 3.  Overview over large privatization  
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
Enterprises 54 215 142 43 17 12 483 
Price million EEK 
Average price 1,000 EEK 
353 
6.5 
1,329 
6.2 
937 
6.6 
474 
11.0 
1,295 
76.2 
318 
26.5 
4,707 
9.7 
Total paid by vouchers 
% paid by vouchers 
0 
0% 
294 
22% 
443 
47% 
134 
28% 
298* 
23% 
76 
24% 
1,245 
26% 
Debt taken over million EEK 
Average debt 1,000 EEK 
196 
3.6 
700 
3.3 
618 
4.4 
230 
5.3 
416 
24.5 
8 
0.7 
2,168 
4.5 
Invest.guarantees million EEK 
Average 1,000 EEK 
237 
4.4 
858 
4.0 
1,021 
7.2 
489 
11.3 
1,715 
100.9 
281 
23.4 
4,601 
9.5 
Job guarantees 
Average 
9,099 
169 
25,573 
119 
17,279 
122 
12,742
30 
2,929 
172 
72 
6 
56,226 
116 
* 50% paid by vouchers, except the shipping comp. sold for 700 million EEK to Norwegian company. 
Source: Mygind (2000), based on the material of EPA. 
Two types of vouchers have been distributed in Estonia. Capital vouchers were 
distributed to all residents depending on years of work. Compensation vouchers were 
distributed to owners of property nationalized in the early Soviet period (or their heirs) 
if they did not want this property back, or if it was not possible to return this property. 
By the end of 1998, 8.3 billion EEK and 7.1 EEK billion compensation vouchers have 
been distributed (Ministry of Finance). The two types of vouchers were used both for 
privatization of real estate and enterprises.  
In March 1995 the biggest investment fund crashed. The resulting losses of investors 
exceeded the losses caused by the banking crisis in 1992-1993. This was an important 
reason why investment funds did not develop like in other countries with voucher 
schemes. Investment funds accumulating vouchers did not have any formulated role in 
the legislation. By June 1996, there were 6 privatization investment funds accumulating 
vouchers whose value constituted only 1% of the total value of the distributed 
vouchers (Kein et al., 1995).   
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Table 4. Use of vouchers  
Nominal value million. EEK 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 total 
Housing 500 1,979 660 283 120 3,542 
Real estate 0 30 204 470 1,342 2,046 
Small enterprises auctions 14 25 75 80 142 336 
Large enterprises tenders 16 726 218 490 243 1,693 
Public offerings 0 704 666 940 0 2,310 
Compensation fund 26 513 528 252 183 1,502 
Total 556 3,977 2,351 2,515 2,030 11,429 
Market/nominal voucher value 0.20 0.17 0.18 0.35 0.28  
Source: Mygind (2000), based on Ministry of Finance.  
Table 5 gives an overview over the distribution of ownership in an Estonian sample of 
666 enterprises at the time of privatization before January 1995 (Jones et al., 1998, p. 
18). 83 firms privatized during 1995 and 1996 were included in the 255 state- and 
municipality-owned enterprises. 6 firms did not give information about their 
ownership at the time of privatization. Among the 405 responding private enterprises 
(666-255-6) slightly more were outside-owned than insider-owned. Enterprises with 
outside majority dominated by domestic owners constitute 31% of the private 
enterprises or 19% of the total. Outside majority with foreign dominance were at the 
same level as inside majority with employee dominance – 22% of the private 
enterprises or 13% of the total. Inside majority dominated by managers made up 16% 
of the private enterprises and 10% of the total. 6% had no majority for either state, 
outsiders or insiders. Employee ownership was most widespread in agriculture (39%) 
and lowest in transport (3%) in January 1995. Manager ownership was most 
widespread in fishing, mining and wood production (27%) and lowest in trade (6%). 
However, by January 1997 the share of manager ownership for the whole economy 
increased to 26%, and in trade to 13% (not reported in the table). 
Table 5. Ownership January 1995 and 1997 size and capital intensity, Jan. 1995  
Majority 
Outsiders Insiders 
     Frequency 
 
Row percent 
State 
foreign 
> 
domestic 
domestic
> fo-reign
manager> 
employee 
employee> 
manager 
No 
ma-
jority 
No 
answer
 
Total 
TOTAL  
Sample at priv. 
Sample Jan. 95 
Whole economy 
Sample Jan. 97 
Whole economy 
 
255(38) 
243(36) 
4,383(39) 
110(17) 
621  (5) 
 
89 (13) 
96 (14) 
2,204(20) 
86 (13) 
3,621(31) 
 
125 (19) 
144 (22) 
1,861(17) 
145 (22) 
2208(19) 
 
65 (10) 
83 (12) 
1,064(10) 
106 (16) 
2,947(26) 
 
88 (13) 
74 (11) 
1,232(11) 
52   (8) 
1,185(10) 
 
38 (6) 
26 (4) 
415 (4) 
17 (3) 
974 (8) 
 
6 (1) 
0 (0) 
- 
150(23 
- 
 
666 (100) 
666 (100) 
11,158(100) 
666 (100) 
11,556(100)
EMPLOYEES 
5-19     
20-99  
100-    
normaliz 
3,315(41) 
902(33) 
166(38) 
 whole  
1,823(23) 
346(13) 
34  (8) 
economy  
1,226(15) 
500(18) 
135(31) 
 
570  (7) 
466(17) 
28  (6) 
 
790 (10) 
368 (14) 
73 (17) 
 
292 (4) 
122 (5) 
0 (0) 
 
- 
- 
- 
 
8,017(100) 
2,705(100) 
436(100) 
Average 205      66      118       59      137     26     - 133 
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Majority 
Outsiders Insiders 
     Frequency 
 
Row percent 
State 
foreign 
> 
domestic 
domestic
> fo-reign
manager> 
employee 
employee>
manager 
No 
ma-
jority 
No 
answer 
 
Total 
25% quartile 
50% median  
75% quartile 
13      
47      
 128      
10      
22      
68      
21       
59       
146       
20      
32      
62      
26     
60     
138     
10     
22     
38     
- 
- 
- 
14 
42 
110 
BRANCHES 
Agricult.  
Fish,mine,wood 
Manu. food etc. 
Manu. paper etc. 
Construction 
Trade 
Transport 
Service 
normalize 
285(28) 
179(31) 
126(20) 
239(22) 
696(57) 
1,748(43) 
132(26) 
977(47) 
 whole  
0 (0) 
28 (5) 
54 (8) 
173(16) 
61 (5) 
1,404(35) 
99 (20) 
383(18) 
economy  
338 (33) 
144 (25) 
227 (35) 
361 (34) 
223 (18) 
255   (6) 
116 (23) 
197   (9) 
 
0   (0) 
154 (27) 
81 (13) 
121 (11) 
86   (7) 
255   (6) 
75 (15) 
293 (14) 
 
390 (39) 
67 (12) 
109 (17) 
94   (9) 
115   (9) 
343   (9) 
17   (3) 
96   (5) 
 
0 (0) 
3 (1) 
46 (7) 
80 (7) 
41 (3) 
29 (1) 
64(13) 
153 (7)
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
1,013(100) 
576(100) 
642(100) 
1,068(100) 
1,222(100) 
4,035(100) 
504(100) 
2,098(100) 
Nom. capital/ 
employee 
1000 EEK 
Average 
25% quartile 
50% median 
75% quartile 
 
 
 
35 
2 
10 
28 
 
 
 
299 
5 
49 
141 
 
 
 
34 
2 
8 
29 
 
 
 
6 
1 
2 
7 
 
 
 
4 
0 
1 
5 
 
 
 
13 
0 
1 
7 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
66 
0,7 
4 
22 
Total assets/ 
employee 
1000 EEK 
Average  
25% quartile 
50% median 
75% quartile 
 
 
 
412 
19 
56 
122 
 
 
 
398 
71 
161 
437 
 
 
 
154 
30 
57 
125 
 
 
 
44 
15 
34 
61 
 
 
 
42 
16 
35 
52 
 
 
 
179 
20 
60 
99 
 
 
 
- 
- 
- 
- 
 
 
 
258 
24 
54 
123 
Source: Mygind (2000). 
At the time of privatization there were 28 employee dominated enterprises with more 
than 100 employees in the sample. By January 1997 this number had fallen to 9. For 
similar enterprises with less than 100 employees the numbers fell from 60 at the time 
of privatization to 42 in January 1997. Normalized for the whole economy, employee 
ownership had in 1995 a higher proportion in large enterprises (17%) than in small 
(10%), but in 1997 the proportion of employee ownership in large enterprises fell to 
7% (not reported). For management dominated enterprises especially the number of 
small enterprises in the sample increased. Domestic-outside-majority-owned 
enterprises increased their share especially for large enterprises. In a multivariate 
analysis, Jones and Mygind (1999) find that if the labour force were to be doubled this 
would lower the probability of a firm remaining insider-owned  by more than 25%, but 
raise the probability of a firm remaining outsider-owned by a little more than 32%. As 
shown in Table 6, employee ownership had the highest proportion of privatized 
enterprises in the early privatization up to 1992 (38% of the enterprises in the sample). 
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Then manager ownership took the leading position 1992-93. Finally, outside-domestic- 
owned-firms constituted the main part for the privatization from 1994.  An even 
smaller part of the new firms were employee-owned. 
Table 6. The relation between time of privatization/start and initial ownership 
 Estonia  Foreign Domestic Manager Employee Total 
Privatized to 1992 9 19% 10 21% 10 21% 18 38% 47 100% 
  1992 - 1993 9 25% 7 19% 13 36% 7 19% 36 100% 
  1994 - 1999 33 13% 144 56% 66 25% 16  6% 259 100% 
  Total 51 15% 161 47% 89 26% 41 12% 342 100% 
New firms to 1992 8* 20% 13 32% 17 42% 3  7% 41 100% 
  1992 - 1993 9 12% 27 35% 29 38% 12 16% 77 100% 
  1994 - 1999 5 11% 17 39% 17 39% 5 11% 44 100% 
  Total 22
* 
15% 57 35% 63 38% 20 13% 162 100% 
Total   73 15% 218 43% 152 30% 61 12% 504 100% 
Only private companies included. We do not have the timing-information for all companies. Therefore, the 
number of enterprises is lower than in the total datasets. *25 foreign new enterprises established before 1992 are 
not included in the table because they were later added to the initial random sample. 
After the initial survey in 1995 subsequent ownership surveys on the Estonia sample of 
enterprises were conducted annually. During this process some firms exited the panel 
because of closure or denial of response. Other groups were added later to give a 
broad coverage of later stages of the privatization process. The total group of 
companies included in this unbalanced panel is 800 companies for the analysis referred 
below for the period 1995-2002.9 The information about the concentration of 
ownership for the largest single owner was used to define ownership of former 
employees as diversified domestic ownership with the largest single owner having less 
than 20% of ownership. This definition can be justified because practically no 
enterprises were privatized to diversified external owners. It is important to distinguish 
between the groups of domestic external investors and former employees because 
there are basic differences between the process behind the ownership change to 
external investors and to employee-owners leaving the firm but keeping their 
ownership.  
The transition matrix for Estonia in Table 7 (Jones et al., 2005, p. 272) shows the 
change between the first known ownership type after privatization (or when the firm 
                                                 
9  The information about the concentration of ownership for the largest single owner was used to 
define ownership of former employees as diversified domestic ownership with the largest single 
owner having less than 20 per cent of ownership. This definition can be justified because 
practically no enterprises were privatized to diversified external owners. It is important to 
distinguish between the groups of domestic external investors and former employees because there 
are basic differences between the process behind the ownership change to external investors and 
to employee-owners leaving the firm but keeping their ownership.  
 20 
3. Incidence Now and Over Time 
 
started as a new entity) and the last year with available information.10 The first line in 
the matrix shows that 114 enterprises, which were foreign-owned at the start of 
privatization (or when they were set up as new firms), also were foreign-owned at the 
last year of record. From the relevant row, it can be seen that 10 changed to domestic 
dominant ownership and 9 to manager ownership while none changed to employee 
ownership. This means that foreign-owned enterprises have a quite stable ownership 
structure with a total ‘ownership-change’ rate of only 14%. Firms with external 
domestic ownership had a higher rate of ‘ownership change’ (26.7%) from the start. 
19.1% have changed into management ownership. Of firms that were initially 
management-owned, 23.6% have changed ownership type and most of these to outside 
ownership (15.7% to domestic and 5.7% to foreign). 
Table 7.  Privatization/start - 2002 ownership transition matrix: first year as private 
by last year recorded    
Total 
     \last year 
first year  
foreign domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total change 
foreign 114 10 9 0 0 133 14,3% 
domestic 11 132 37 0 0 180 26,7% 
manager 8 22 107 3 0 140 23,6% 
employee 6 22 35 28 8 99 71,7% 
former emp. 0 4 3 2 15 24 37,5% 
total 139 190 191 33 23 576  
Privatized 
     \last year 
first year  
foreign domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total change 
foreign 45 4 1 0 0 50 10,0% 
domestic 8 106 15 0 0 129 17,8% 
manager 2 11 56 2 0 71 21,1% 
employee 1 12 15 11 3 42 73,8% 
former emp. 0 4 2 2 12 20 40,0% 
total 56 137 89 15 15 312  
New 
     \last year 
first year  
foreign domestic manager employee former 
employee 
total change 
foreign 69 6 8 0 0 83 16,9% 
domestic 3 26 22 0 0 51 49,0% 
manager 6 11 51 1 0 69 26,1% 
employee 5 10 20 17 5 57 70,2% 
former emp. 0 0 1 0 3 4 25,0% 
total 83 53 102 18 8 264  
1. Former employee ownership defined as domestic dominant with concentration <20% 1999.  
                                                 
10  The person or entity owing the biggest share is considered as the owner. The results follow the 
same pattern as the not reported matrix without estimates of former employee ownership. 
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2. Only those firms with domestic dominant ownership and with information on concentration in 1999 are 
included; their number fell from 649 to 568. Companies included, for which we have data only for some years, 
e.g. 1997-2000. 
Only 3 firms (2.1%) have changed into employee ownership. By contrast, movement 
away from employee ownership proceeds at a very high rate with more than seven in 
ten cases switching ownership type. In about half of these 71.7% the move is to 
ownership by management. This includes 35.4% of the initial group, compared to 
28.3% to outside ownership and 8.1% to former employees. It might seem surprising 
that ownership by former employees is more stable than employee ownership. 
Actually, the continuation of ownership by employees leaving the firm can be taken as 
an indicator of inertia which also functions as a barrier for further ownership changes.  
Surprisingly, the results are quite robust to dividing the groups into privatized and 
start-ups. Because of the initial disequilibrium in ownership caused by privatization one 
might expect a higher rate of change for privatized companies. However, the initial 
years of transition are very volatile both for privatized and new companies both 
because of rapidly changing markets and institutional environment. In a more stable 
institutional environment one might expect a higher change-rate for new companies as 
compared to more mature companies. 
Jones, Kalmi and Mygind (2005) find in a multivariate analysis that firms owned by 
insiders are less capitalized. This supports the hypothesis that insufficient wealth to 
invest in equity limits the possibilities to establish employee-owned firms, and points 
out that the unusual circumstances created by the privatization process have helped 
employees to temporarily overcome this obstacle. A second major finding is related to 
risk. The results show that employee ownership is most durable in less volatile firms.  
The survey evidence reported in Kalmi (2003) as well as the case study evidence 
reported in Kalmi and Mygind (2003) points out that Estonian firms often apply by-
laws that limit the group of potential shareholders. This reduces outsider take-overs. 
On the other hand, outsider-owned firms also place similar restrictions. There is 
evidence concerning the tendency for the number of employee-owners to decline over 
time (Kalmi, 2002, 2003). This is a result of restrictions on share trading - it is not 
possible for outsiders to buy shares and new employees face similar difficulties. By 
contrast, retiring employees often keep their shares, or they sell them to managers. As a 
result, we observe less employee ownership, fewer employee owners, increased 
ownership by former employees (which is typically transitory), more managerial 
ownership, and more concentrated ownership. A key finding is that it is often the 
inactivity in the share market – or indeed the absence of any market – more than active 
trading of shares that shapes the ownership relations. The process is biased in ways 
promoting managerial ownership and discouraging employee ownership and 
ownership changes in general. 
Under the direction of Kalmi and Mygind 12 case studies of employee-owned firms 
have been performed in Estonia. The studies cover the period from before 
privatization to around 2000. The results are published in Kalmi and Mygind (2003), 
see Table 8. Ten of the enterprises in case studies were privatized in the early period 
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when the privatization process remained in a political deadlock resolved only in June 
1993 with the introduction of the new privatization law. The cases show the variation 
in privatization methods leading to employee ownership. 
Table 8. Determinants behind initial employee ownership at time of privatization  
Time around 
privatization 
Product Privatization method Motivation/ 
economic 
situation 
Size 
empl.
Capital/ labour 
Estre Agro 
machines 
1991  leasing   
1998  takeover  
          public offering 
Participation, 
economy bad from 
1992 
512 
(1991)
probably 
quite low 
Printing 
House 
Printing 
books 
1991  leasing  
1993  coll.-> individual 
1997  full privatization 
quality assets  
good results 
cream 
177 
(1995)
quite high 
Ramsi Peat 
products 
1991  leasing  
96-99 full privatization 
defensive 
save jobs 
250 
(1991)
quite low 
Ester furniture 
for shops 
1986  new co-operative 
1991  joint stock  
quite bad 
1991 
111 
(1991)
quite low 
KeVa 
 
Transport 1991  leasing 
1993  full privatization 
participation 
economy quite 
good, cream? 
356 
(1991)
quite high 
Kommunal-
projekt 
City 
planning 
1997  public tender 
          privatization 
economy quite bad 
1997 
111 
(1997)
low 
EKE Ariko 
 
Consulting 1991  privatization with
          retained profits 
quite good 
not cream 
 30 
(1991)
low 
Puurmani agro milk 
etc. 
1993  from agricultural 
to  worker co-operative
          green vouchers 
defensive 
bad economy 
save jobs 
305 
(1993)
quite low 
Sektoron fuel, petro 
resale 
1992  privatization by 
          comp. auction 
defensive, 
but assets OK 
8 
(1992)
quite high 
SH Tamp 
 
Metal 
precision 
instrument
s 
1991  small state 
          enterprise 
1994  EPA 
privatization 
defensive, 
but assets OK 
110 
(1991)
quite high 
Viru Ölu  beer 
softdrinks 
1991  spin off agro 
          privatization 
defensive, 
but assets OK 
130 
(1991)
quite high 
Norma safety belts 1991  people’s  
          enterprise 
1994  EPA 
privatization 
participation 
cream 
good assets 
2,781 
(1991)
quite high 
Source: Kalmi and Mygind (2003).         
We find only few examples of cream-skimming, where insiders took over valuable 
assets at a relatively low price. To this group belong Printing House and Norma. Norma 
was a well-known company with a good reputation and profit margin around 40% in 
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1991-92. Norma employees could take over the assets for a low leasing fee in the first 
round as a people’s enterprise. However, in the second round of privatization through 
the Privatization Agency the price went up and especially some managers made a good 
deal. Printing House benefited from better technology than its competitors had and a 
quite stable market. However, the price paid in the final privatization of 1997 was quite 
high. 
In many cases the new firms were spin-offs of larger firms (Ramsi, Sektoron, Viru Õlu, 
SH Tamp). The spin-offs often represented the more promising business lines of 
former state firms or collective farms. However, with the exception of Viru Õlu, the 
main motive of these firms was to save jobs, so these privatizations were rather 
defensive. Another example of defensive privatizations is Puurmani. Ester is a special 
case since it had already been operating for five years at the beginning of transition.  
In the West employee ownership is concentrated in enterprises with low capital 
intensity because problems of risk concentration and lack of capital discourage 
employees from owning firms with high capital intensity. However, specific 
opportunities in the privatization process may help to overcome these barriers. This 
happened in the cases of Printing House, KeVa, Sektoron, SH Tamp, Viru Ölu and Norma. 
However, in the cases of Printing House and Sektoron the employees actually paid a 
rather high price for the assets, whereas special opportunities of leasing, vouchers and 
the legislation on people’s enterprise made it possible for the employees to take over 
the assets at low cost in the other mentioned cases. However, in the second round of 
privatization by the Privatization Agency the price increased considerably in the case of 
Norma and SH Tamp and this was the main reason why the managers increased their 
stakes considerably through new share issues.                          
Newly started companies with high financial participation of employees can be 
expected to be found in industries with high input of human capital – because here the 
motivation, recruitment and retention of the knowledge workers are often decisive for 
the success of the companies (Mygind, 2001, p. 325). Therefore, research has been 
done on employee participation in the IT sector in Estonia. 
In an interview with one of the leading Estonian IT specialist, Linnar Viik, he 
mentioned that workers participation is not an issue in the Estonian IT sector, with 
very few exceptions. In big IT companies, like Microlink, Abobase, Helmes, Ordi, Starman, 
the motivation system is based on share-options. Key workers can buy options and feel 
themselves as a part of firm. The majority of IT companies are small. One or a few of 
the employees are usually the owners. Functions like bookkeeping are outsourced or 
done by hired employees. In many cases IT students work on a contract base as 
programmers. Labour turnover is often high among the programmers. 
Helmes11 is a typical small IT consulting and systems integration company which was 
established in 1991 in Tallinn and presently employs 50 consultants with a solid 
background of building business critical IT systems. In order to motivate the 
                                                 
11  See http://www.helmes.ee. 
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employees, Helmes has decided to use partnership scheme. According to internal rules 
of Helmes partnership shares of employees should cover at least 50% of private assets 
of employees. A partner is not just a shareholder; he or she must work in company.   
Table 9. Governance cycles: employee-management-outside in 12 Estonian cases 
Ownershi
p 
Broad 
employee 
Employee 
management 
Management Management 
former empl. 
Foreign 
 
Estre 1991/1998 
leasing/full 
  employee 
minority 
 
Printing 
House 
1991/1997 
leasing/full 
  employee 
minority 
 
Ramsi 1991/1996 
leasing/full 
  employee 
minority 
 
Ester 1986 
co-operative 
1991 
joint stock 
1993 
by share issue 
1998  liqui-
dated and split 
 
KeVa 1991 
leasing 
gradual 
change 
1995 manage-
ment majority 
  
Kommun
al-projekt 
 1997 tender 
privatization 
1999 nearly 
100% man. 
  
EKE 
Ariko 
1988 
small SE 
  chief consult 
+former empl. 
 
Puurmani 1992 
agri coop 
  gradually 
former empl. 
 
Sektoron 1992 
spin off 
  gradually 
former empl. 
 
SH Tamp 1991 
small SE 
 small part Prede  foreign  
tunneling 
Viru Ölu  1989 spin-off 
from kolhoz 
   1992 
Danish 
Norma 1991 
peoples’ e. 
 1994  1999 
Swedish 
Source: Kalmi and Mygind (2003). 
The 12 Estonian cases give detailed information on the governance cycle at the firm 
level. There is still employee majority in Printing House, Estre and Ramsi, although 
management and former employees have increased their shares. Estre is exceptional 
because the proportion of employee-owners increased from 28% to 58%, even though 
shares were not offered to new employees. The reason for this is that employees who 
initially bought shares were much more likely to remain employed. Managers have 
taken over the majority in Ester and KeVa and increased their share in Kommunalprojekt 
to nearly 100%. Management has taken over Norma by 1994, and later it was sold to a 
foreign investor. In Viru Ölu and SH Tamp there was a direct change from employee to 
foreign ownership. In the case of SH Tamp, the acquired part of the company was 
closed down after taking out the human and physical assets. Only a small part 
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continued to exist as management-owned the enterprise under the name Prede. Finally, 
in Eke Ariko, Puurmani and Sektoron ownership followed the leaving employees out of 
the companies and management also increased its shares. 
Table 10.   Takeover and concentration processes  
 Managers increase share  Outsiders increase share Exit 
Estre no 
employee owner-rate  increased 
former employees 
(trade union ) 
no 
Printing 
House 
management increased share, but still 
employee majority 
former employees 
other outsiders excluded 
no 
Ramsi management increased share, but still 
employee domination 
former employees 
other outsiders falling share 
no 
Ester through new share issue 1993 
and fully management ownership 
after split/liquidation in 1998 
no liq. and 
split in 
1998 
KeVa through several share issues 1995 former employees get 
majority 
no 
Kommunal
-projekt 
managers majority from time of 
privatization, later further increase 
no no 
EKE Ariko concentration to core group 
mainly through share issues 
former employees spin off 
Puurmani managers some increase 
but still employee dominated 
former employees  no 
Sektoron No former employees and outsiders 
has got majority 
no 
SH Tamp 
Prede 
through new share issues financing 
final privatization,  
still employee majority 1995 
Successor-firm-manager-owned 
former employees, 
1995 foreign takeover of the 
most valuable part of assets, 
compensation to shareholders 
main part 
closed 
1995 
Viru Ölu  1991-92 especially managers increase 
their share  
1991-92 outside coop-members 
sell to insiders 
1992 foreign takeover,  
20% left to employees,  
1996: 6%, 1999<1% 
no 
Norma 1994 managers buy 75% shares 
during transition to joint-stock com. 
1996  34% on stock exchange => 
increase external ownership  
1999/00 51% Swedish investor 
19% owned by two banks 
no 
Source: Kalmi and Mygind (2003). 
In cooperation with the Estonian statistical office we have done a survey in January 
2005 on the ownership structure in 722 companies (a stratified random sample with 
overrepresentation of medium to large-sized companies). The results show a further 
decline of employee ownership. Table 11 shows different degrees of employee 
ownership distributed on the dominant owner (with the largest proportion of shares). 
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Table 11. Degrees of employee ownership distributed on dominant owner, Jan. 
2005 
 Percentage of shares owned by employees 
Dominant 
owner 
0% 0.1-9.9% 10-19.9% 20-49.9% 50-99.9% 100% Total 
State 1      1 
Foreign 185 7 2    199 
Domestic 229 29 13 19   299 
Manager 146 30 14 28   218 
Employee    5 13 1 19 
Total 561 66 29 52 13 1 722 
% of firms 77.7% 9.1% 4.0% 7.2% 1.8% 0.1% 100.0% 
Only 14 or 2% of the companies had majority ownership by employees in January 
2005. (If we include companies with insider majority and other employees own more 
than managers the number increases to 3%). In 78% of the companies there was no 
employee ownership, while 20% of the enterprises had a minority employee shares. 
Most often these minority shares are less than 10% of total shares; however, in 7% of 
the enterprises employees own 20-49.9%. Only 4% of foreign dominated companies 
had employee minority shares, while 33% of the companies dominated by managers 
had employee shares. 
Surprisingly, the survey shows that employee ownership is randomly spread over the 
different industries. There is no significant variation on size and thus no tendency for a 
higher percentage of employee ownership in smaller firms.  
Survey and case study evidence shows that there is a general decline in employee 
ownership. The causes of this decline are keeping of shares by former employees, no 
possibility of obtaining shares by new employees, buying out of employees’ shares and 
of newly issued shares by managers. 
 
c) Privatization in Agriculture 
Agriculture was with 39% of the enterprises in January 1995 the sector with the highest 
rate of majority employee ownership after privatization. 78% of the employees in 
agriculture were owners (Mygind 2000, p. 30). Like in other sectors, employee 
ownership had a falling trend since then, but majority-employee-owned firms have 
been prevailing over a long period of time. Among the Estonian cases Puurmani and 
Viru Ölu had their origin in agricultural collectives. While the brewery Viru Ôlu quite 
early was taken over by a foreign investor, the farm Puurmani kept the co-operative 
structure while ownership changed gradually away from employee dominance as the 
economic downturn meant that the majority of employees left the company while still 
being members of the co-operative. The survey from January 2005 shows that there is 
no significant overrepresentation of employee ownership in agriculture by 2005. 
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d) Co-operatives 
As can be seen from Table 12, a considerable number of enterprises originated from 
former co-operatives. The supplier and consumer co-operatives were typically 
privatized to outside owners while agricultural collectives / co-operatives went to 
employees. Some of the new firms included in Table 6 cover new co-operatives, of 
which most went to employees. They changed ownership structure to LLC or JSC and 
have later followed the same trend as other employee-owned companies, which means 
that they have been taken over by managers or outside owners. One of the cases from 
the study, Ester, is a good example. It was established as a new co-operative in 1986 as 
a spin-off from a large textile company, in 1990, it was transferred to a JSC and later 
split up and taken over by the managers (Kalmi et al., 2003).  
Table 12.  Origin and ownership at the time of privatization (private firms 1995) 
 Former 
state firms 
Former co-
operatives 
Former  
joint ventures 
New firms Total 
Foreign 9 
(8.5%) 
1 
(1.5%) 
30 
(91.0%) 
48 
(30.4%) 
88 
(24.2%) 
Domestic 
outsiders 
33 
(31.1%) 
46 
(68.7%) 
3 
(9.0%) 
34 
(21.5%) 
116 
(31.9%) 
Managers 26 
(24.5%) 
4 
(6.0%) 
0 58 
(36.7%) 
88 
(24.2%) 
Employees 38 
(35.8%) 
16 
(23.9%) 
0 18 
(11.4%) 
72 
(19.8%) 
Total 106 67 33 158 364 
Source: Kalmi (2003, p. 122), originally from database of Estonian enterprises CEES/CBS.  
 
e) Profit-Sharing 
Some information on profit-sharing in Estonia can be found in the Estonian 
management survey which was done by Mygind in cooperation with the Estonian 
Statistical Office (ESA) with 181 interviews in November/ December 1997 and 31 
interviews in the summer of 1998. The total response was 220 including 8 of the pilot 
surveys, however, the total number of answers (N) to some questions is lower. 
Table 13.   Forms of payment for employees - on ownership - 1997  
 \majority 
ownership 
state fo-
reign 
do-
mestic
mana-
ger 
em-
ployee
no 
major 
total priva-
tized 
new coop 
profit-sharing 
                            N 
   1 
   9 
   2 
 35 
   4 
 69 
   3 
 51 
   2  
  24 
   0 
   8 
  13 
 204 
   2 
 66 
   6 
 83 
   4 
 39 
monetary incentive 
scheme               N 
   3 
   9 
  26 
  35 
 36 
 69 
 21 
 50 
 14 
 25 
   4 
   7 
 108 
 203 
 42 
 69 
 39 
 80 
 20 
 38 
non-monetary 
benefits               N 
   0 
   9 
   8 
  36 
 10 
 64 
 2 
 52 
 0 
 25 
   0 
   9 
 20 
 202 
 6 
 67 
 12 
 82 
 4 
 37 
Source: Mygind (2002). 
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Profit-sharing is not common in Estonia, but other forms of monetary incentive 
schemes are used in more than fifty percent of the cases (Mygind, 2002, p. 19). As an 
example of profit-sharing, a case study on the realtor firm Pindi Kinnisvara was 
conducted (Eamets et al., 2005), because this management-owned firm developed a 
specific employment system, see Table 14.  
Table 14.  Structure of work contracts in Pindi Kinnisvara 
Form of contract No 
Work contracts 48 
Work contact plus self employment 2 
Self- employed 35 
Self employed plus limited liability company 7 
Work contact plus limited liability company 4 
Total 96 
Half of the employees in the Estonia subsidiary of company have ordinary 
employment contracts. Contracts of service (self-employment) are used by most estate 
agents. 7 estate agents with a long-term experience use combination of self-
employment with limited liability company for tax reasons. The combination of an 
employment contract and self-employment is used by heads of departments who, at 
the same time, work as estate agents. Estate agents have no fixed working time and 
their income depends directly on the turnover of their activities. The combination of 
employment and services contract are used by book-keepers. Only technical staff 
(secretaries, assistants, marketing managers etc.) has regular 8-hours working days and 
fixed wages.  
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4. Empirical Evidence of Economic and Social Effects 
 
To assess the economic performance of different ownership structures the initial 
conditions - size, capital-intensity and profitability - must be taken into consideration. 
As is shown above, foreign-owned enterprises have a relatively high capital-intensity 
while the opposite is the case for insider-owned enterprises. Because insiders especially 
in small enterprises often had the first choice it could be expected that they had 
skimmed the cream. We do not have any significant results indicating that insiders took 
over the most profitable enterprises (Jones and Mygind 1999). However, insiders might 
have acquired their enterprises at a relatively low price as also indicated for the early 
small privatization.  
Data on performance can be taken from the sample of 666 enterprises covering the 
period 1993-97 with detailed ownership information and financial variables and the 
financial survey 1997 done by ESA covering all large enterprises and a representative 
sample of small enterprises, with information on foreign, but without information on 
insider ownership. 
An analysis on total factor productivity was conducted in Jones and Mygind, 2002. The 
analysis is based on panel-data for the period 1993-1997. Depending on the exact 
specification of the model, the analysis shows that private ownership has 13-15% 
higher factor productivity than state ownership. Majority ownership by foreigners are 
19-21% higher, majority management ownership 15-31% higher, and majority 
ownership by a broad group of employees 13-24% higher that state ownership. These 
results are, noteworthy, both because of the high reliability and because standard 
theory would not expect so high efficiency of insider-owned enterprises.  
Profitability measures for the early years show that insider ownership has quite high 
profitability, while, especially for return on assets, they are quite low for foreign 
ownership. However, this might be connected with high levels of assets, which at this 
point in time have not started to pay off. The surprisingly high profitability measures 
for state-owned enterprises might be explained by the dominance of some natural 
monopolies, e.g. telecommunication and energy, doing quite well in 1997. There are no 
significant differences between domestic and foreign ownership in the private sector. 
As Table 15 shows, all the 12 case companies faced considerable problems in the early 
stage of transition leading to declining sales. It is remarkable, that all of them did 
considerable reactive restructuring, except of SH Tamp, by cutting employment 
irrespective of their ownership structure. Lack of capital meant lack of strategic 
restructuring in the cases of Kommunalprojekt and Puurmani, but the remaining ten firms 
did some strategic restructuring in spite of lack of capital in many of the cases. 
However, in the cases of Viru Ölu and Norma we saw increased investments after the 
foreign takeover. 
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Table  15.   Governance and restructuring  
 Reactive restructuring Strategic restructuring 
Estre 
 
 
+ employment cut to half by 1993 
later further reduction  
legislation cause excess labor  
++ change of product, +exports 
increasing investments 
Printing 
House 
+ not necessary ++ high profitability 
quite high investment,  
but further increase needed 
Ramsi +
+ 
steep employment fall in early 
years, many temporary workers 
+ focus on peat production 
developing Western markets 
upgrade quality, low investments 
Ester 
 
+
+ 
employment cut 70%  1991-93 
and in connection to split 1998 
+  
KeVa +
+ 
employment cut to half 1991-93 
and to a quarter by 1999 
++ developing new product-lines 
+export and high investments 
Kommun
al-projekt 
+
+ 
strong cuts before privatization - limited, lack of capital 
EKE 
Ariko 
+
+ 
flexible employment policy ++ new product, foreign clients 
high investment IT, buildings 
Puurmani + strong cuts in employment,  
but still some excess labor 
- lack of capital  
Sektoron +
+ 
quite flexible adjustment + some investments in mid 1990’s, but lack 
of capital 
SH Tamp 
 
- stable employment up to 1995? + 1995 sale of high tech assets to US 
investor => close down 
Viru Ölu  + some employment cuts in early 
years 
+ 
++ 
some early investments 
high investment after takeover 
Norma +
+ 
1000 jobs cut 1991-1994 
core competence safety belts 
++ high investments whole period, intensified 
after foreign takeover 
- no restructuring, + some restructuring, ++ strong restructuring 
Source: Kalmi and Mygind (2003). 
 
In the survey on 220 enterprises managers were asked about the different sources of 
finance (Mygind, 2002, p. 23). The responses show that for all companies internal 
savings were the most important source. However, employee-owned enterprises were 
clearly most dependent on internal savings. The problem of external finance and the 
general low capital intensity on insider-owned firms were also reflected in the results 
on investment showing that insider-owned enterprises were low on investment per 
employee, while foreign and external domestic ownership have high investment levels. 
Concerning another indicator of strategic restructuring, Western exports, foreign-
owned enterprises are on the highest level for while insider-owned enterprises were at 
the lower end. 
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As an aspect of the social impact of employees’ financial participation, the level of 
wages and the wage differences between different groups inside the company is 
relevant. The manager survey in Estonia gives some indications, see Table 16. 
Table 16.  Average monthly salary on ownership - 1997 
 \majority ownership 
wage EEK 
state foreign do-
mes-
tic
mana-
ger
em-
ploy-
ee
no 
ma-
jority
total priva-
tized 
new coop
top manager - mean  
standard deviation 
N 
7,187
6,834
8
15,462
18,525
35
9,744
9,864
66
9,984
15,903
52
4,477
3,314
25
6,670
4,802
8
10,370 
13,301 
194 
10,526 
14,238 
68 
9,975
14,370
82
8,686
8,454
37
all employees, mean 
standard deviation 
N 
2840
1,951
9
5,373
3,099
36
3271
2,924
70
3,277
1,721
53
2451
1,260
23
2635
1,442
8
3,559 
2,529 
203 
2,987 
2,875 
70 
2,785
2,915
85
1,715
1,233
39
lowest paid empl.  
standard deviation 
N 
1,049
7,19
9
2,153
1,721
36
1,179
609
70
1,441
985
53
734
684
25
795
1,051
8
1,456 
1,022 
195 
1,368 
604 
70 
1,549
1,458
85
897
707
39
top manager/employees 
standard deviation 
3.00
1.04
2.76
1.32
3.23
2.57
3.09
4.43
 1.88
0.57
2.78
1.99
2.92 
2.88 
3.18 
4.52 
2.65
2.12
3.15
2.12
average/lowest paid 
standard deviation 
3.06
1.48
2.61
1.46
3.06
2.87
2.62
1.22
2.92
1.38
2.74
0.90
2.82 
1.90 
2.70 
1.06 
2.64
1.37
2.69
1.06
Source: Mygind (2002). 
When looking at the social impact of employees’ financial participation concerning the 
level of wages and the wage differences between different groups inside the companies 
the pay for the lowest employee was very low even by Estonian standards, but 
although the researchers asked about full time wage, the responses may cover part time 
employees. Both managers and other employees had a significant higher salary in 
foreign-owned enterprises than in other types. Employee-owned enterprises and no 
majority enterprises were found in the other end of the scale. State-owned enterprises 
were also below the average. The average wage for all employees and for the lowest 
paid employee was higher in new than in privatized companies. However, the lowest 
level was found in the co-operatives, probably because of quite low levels of pay in 
agricultural related production. 
The difference between the salaries of managers as compared with other employees 
was lowest in employee-owned enterprises and high in management-owned 
enterprises. It seems that managers took out part of their ownership remuneration in 
the form of salaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 32 
5. Conclusions 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The current level of development of financial participation of employees is low. It is 
due to the fact that the aims of economic policy of the government since 1993 have 
been contrary to the idea of participation of employees, e.g. of financial participation, 
favouring the principles of laissez-fair doctrine and protection of national elites. 
Employee share ownership which emerged during the first years of privatization has 
been and still is on the decrease. However, there is a substantial difference between the 
employee ownership in the industrial sector and in agriculture, since there was more 
support for privatization by employees in agriculture and employees still hold a 
significant number of shares. Individual enterprises, especially in such branches as IT 
and real estate sector, introduce profit-sharing and share options schemes for 
employees, but their number is small. The number of co-operatives is small and 
decreasing, and there are nearly no workers’ co-operatives left, whereas the number of 
self-employed is large and increasing due to advantageous taxation.    
The evidence of the impact of employees’ financial participation in Estonia concerns 
the economic performance of employee-owned enterprises. The results show that 
productivity of employee-owned companies does not differ significantly from the 
productivity of other domestic companies. Only foreign-owned companies are 
significantly more productive and have a higher degree of strategic restructuring. The 
main problem for insider-owned companies is the access to capital for investment. 
They have a relatively low level of bank loans and the owners usually do not have extra 
funds to invest in their company. Wage-levels are relatively low, but especially for the 
higher salaried employees, so that the difference between the highest and the lowest 
paid employee is typically lower in employee-owned enterprises.                                                                 
The privatization opened up possibilities for employee ownership. This wave turned 
out to be quite short-lived because there were no political forces which were interested 
in strengthening employee participation. The start of the first employee-owned 
enterprises dates back to new co-operatives, leased enterprises and small state-owned 
enterprises in the last years of the Soviet Union. The small privatization was the most 
important method for employee takeovers in the early 1990ies. However, in most cases 
the managers took the initiative and often de facto controlled the enterprises. The 
domination of managers explains the relatively fast change away from employee 
ownership to management ownership, which were observed both in quantitative 
studies and in case studies. Managers were able to buy the shares at a relatively low 
price, since employees were in a situation of liquidity constraint and did not have 
information about the real value of their shares. Often employees kept their shares 
after retiring, while new employees did not have the opportunity to buy shares. In this 
way many employee-owned enterprises changed to enterprises owned by outsiders 
including former employees. Most companies including employee-owned companies 
experienced a steep fall in employment, so that employees are more interested in 
remaining employed than in promoting the rights of employees.  
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There is no special legal regulation of any of employees’ financial participation 
schemes. This means that there are neither incentives nor restrictions concerning 
financial participation of employees in the legislation. Employees who are minority 
shareholders have only a limited possibility to influence the management of the 
company under Estonian company law. According to Estonian tax law, it is more 
profitable for employees to receive dividends than wages because employees pay no 
taxes on dividends, but the opposite is advantageous for the company because the 
company is obliged to pay taxes on dividends whereas it has to pay no taxes on 
employees’ wages and no corporate income tax.   
The necessity of transformation of acquis communautaire into national law in connection 
with the EU accession has recently led to debates on employee participation in 
decision-making. In this connection, the Law on Involvement of Employees in the 
Activities of EC-scale Undertakings, EC-scale Groups of Undertakings and European 
Companies transforming EC directives 94/45/EC and 2001/86/EC was adopted on 
12 January 2005. Although the number of European Companies in Estonia is small, 
the parliamentary debate showed that the issue of employee participation is still 
controversial although it had not been addressed in the legislation. The draft of 
another, more general law on employee participation was rejected, but the discussion 
on this issue can continue.    
Neither the government nor the social partners presently promote or are planning to 
promote financial participation schemes. Political forces which could have promoted 
the idea of employees’ participation e.g. the Social Democratic Party and the trade 
unions are weak and do not have the necessary political influence. However, as the 
discussion on transformation of EU directives shows, the issue will be addressed and 
even new legislation could be adopted if an EU legal act on financial participation of 
employees were issued.    
 
 34 
Bibliography 
 
Bibliography 
 
Arkadie, B. V. et al. (1991), Economic Survey of the Baltic Republics, Stockholm.  
Eamets, R. and Kallaste, E. (2003), The Role of Trade Unions in Labour Market Flexibility: 
The Case of Estonia, Tartu.  
Eamets R., Raal, R. and Masso, J. (2005), ‘Estonia: towards a rather mixed world of 
work’  in Working and Employment Conditions in New EU Member States – Convergence or 
Diversity?, Vaughan-Whitehead, D. (ed.), Geneva: International Labour Office, pp. 99-
159. 
Jones, D. C., Kalmi, P. and Mygind, N. (2003), Choice of Ownership Structure and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Estonia, BOFIT (Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in 
Transition) Discussion Papers, No. 7. 
Jones, D. C., Kalmi, P. and Mygind, N. (2005), ‘Choice of Ownership Structure and 
Firm Performance: Evidence from Estonia’, Post-Communist Economies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
pp. 83-107.  
Jones, D. C. and Mygind, N. (1998), ‘Ownership Patterns and Dynamics in Privatized 
Firms’ in Transitions Economies: Evidence from the Baltics, CEES Working Paper Series, 
Issue 15, Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School, Center for East European 
Studies, published also in Baltic Journal of Economics, Vol. 2, No. 2, Winter 1999.  
Jones, D. C. and Mygind, N. (1999), ‘The Nature and Determinants of Ownership 
Changes after Privatization: Evidence from Estonia’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 
Vol. 27, No. 3.  
Jones, D. C. and Mygind, N. (2005), ‘Corporate governance cycles during transition: 
theory and evidence from the Baltics’ in The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance, I. 
Filatochev and M. Wright (eds.), Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 253-286.  
Kalmi, P. (2003), ‘The Rise and Fall of Employee Ownership in Estonia, 1987-2001’, 
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 8, pp. 1213-1239.  
Kalmi, P. and Mygind, N. (2003), Privatisation and Evolution of Ownership and Corporate 
Governance in Estonia - 12 Cases, Center for East European Studies, Copenhagen 
Business School (mimeo).  
Kalmi, P. (2002), On the (In)stability of Employee Ownership – Estonian Evidence and Lessons 
for Transition Economies, PhD.serie 10.2002, Copenhagen Business School.  
Kein, A. and Tali, V. (1995), ‘The Process of Ownership Reform and Privatization’ in 
Transforming the Estonian Economy, O. Lugus (ed.), Tallinn: Institute of Economics, pp. 
140-168.  
Kein, A. and Terk, E. (1997), ‘Management-Byu-Out and Management-Buy-In in 
Estonia’ in Management-Buy-Out and Management Buy-In as a Privatization Instrument, 
  35 
Extended Country Report Estonia 
 
 
Studien des Instituts für Sozialforschung und Gesellschaftspolitik (ISG), No. 17, 
Cologne 1997, pp.149-197.  
Klauberg, T. (2004), Gesellschaftsrecht in Estland, Lettland und Litauen, Heidelberg et al.: 
Hüthig Jehle Rehm GmbH.  
Krinal, V. (2001), ‘100 aastat eestlaste ühistegevust’, Ühistegelised uudised, No. 6, 7.  
Mygind, N. (1994), ‘The Economic Transition in the Baltic Countries - Differences and 
Similarities’ in The Politics of Transition in the Baltic States - Democratization and Economic 
Reform Policies, J. A. Dellenbrant and O. Nørgaard (eds.), Umeå University Research 
Report, No. 2, Umeå, pp. 197-234.  
Mygind, N. (1995), ‘Privatisation and employee-ownership in the Baltic countries - a 
comparative analysis of conditions and development’ in Privatisation and Financial 
Participation in the Baltic Countries - Midterm Results, N. Mygind (ed.), Frederiksberg: 
Copenhagen Business School, pp. 199-284.  
Mygind, N. (1996), ‘Privatisation and Employee Ownership in the Baltic Countries: A 
Comparative Analysis of Conditions and Development’ in Privatization and Financial 
Participation in the Baltic Countries, N. Mygind (ed.), Copenhagen. 
Mygind, N. (2000), Privatisation, Governance and Restructuring of Enterprises in the Baltics, 
Working paper CCNM/BALT, No. 6, OECD – Centre of Co-operation with Non-
members, pp. 1-83.  
Mygind, N. (2001), ‘Enterprise Governance in Transition - a Stakeholder Perspective’, 
Acta Oeconomica, Vol. 3, pp. 315-342.  
Mygind, N. (2002), Ownership, control, compensation and restructuring of Estonian enterprises – 
preliminary results from a manager survey, CEES Working Paper Series, Issue 42, 
Frederiksberg: Copenhagen Business School, Center for East European Studies.  
Purju, A. (1996), The Political Economy of Privatization in Estonia, Working paper, Centre 
for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh.  
Tavits, G. (2004), ‘Representing Employers in Enterprises and Installations – Estonia’s 
Choices’, Juridica, No. X (in Estonian).  
Terk, E. (1996), ‘Employee Ownership and the Political Debate in Estonia 1987-1994’ 
in Privatization and Financial Participation in the Baltic Countries, N. Mygind (ed.), 
Copenhagen, pp. 95-122. 
Terk, E. (2000), Privatisation in Estonia – Ideas – Process – Results, Tallinn: Estonian 
Institute for Futures Studies. 
 36 
